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The Socialist World in the Second Age of
Globalization: An Alternative History?
The history of the Second Age of Globalization (from 1945 through to the
present) has traditionally been told through the lens of either the industrially
advanced First World, or, more critically, the developing countries of the
Third World. Following the collapse of the global economy in the depression
years of the 1930s and the destruction of WWII, these accounts run, the
West, under the leadership of the United States, sought to rebuild global
institutions in line with liberal economic principles. This international liberal
order that became known as the Bretton Woods system, structured the
processes of globalization that would continue even after the system’s
collapse in 1973. Post-war globalization was an expansive process, in
which developing economies in Latin America, Africa and Asia were
gradually integrated into economic institutions already rooted in the core
economies of North America, Western Europe and Japan.
Such conventional historical accounts of post-war globalization have
no place for the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe – what this
review will term the “socialist world.” Not until the collapse of communist
regimes over the years 1989-91 and their subsequent transition to market
economies, it would seem, were these regions integrated into the global
economy. There are two reasons for this absence. First, historians of
globalization have tacked closely to a Cold War paradigm that posits a
sharp dichotomy between the capitalist and communist worlds. As two
historians of globalization note, following 1945 “a deliberate attempt [was]
made to establish a better world order according to two competing models
in two competing power blocs” (Osterhammel and Petersson 2009, p. 29).
From this paradigm it follows that, as post-war globalization was bound up
with the liberal institutions of the capitalist West, the socialist world must
have pursued a different and rival historical path. This historical perspective
is complemented by the views of economists and economic historians who
have typically characterized the socialist world as isolated from broader
global trends, “cut off from the rest of the world by inward-looking,
authoritarian regimes” (Jeffrey Sachs 1999, p.3) and “virtual autarchy”
(Maddison 2013, p. 341).
The absence of the socialist world in existing historical accounts of
globalization raises an important question: is there a distinct history of
socialist globalization separate from that of the capitalist west? Two recent
books by Oscar Sanchez-Sibony (2014) and Johanna Bockman (2011)
suggest that, far from pursuing a separate historical trajectory, the socialist
world was closely entangled with the post-WWII global political economy.
Sanchez-Sibony’s Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the
Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev is a fascinating revisionist
history of the Soviet Union and its place in the global economy. Told from
the perspective of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and its longest-serving
minister, Anastas Mikoyan, the book disabuses readers of lazy assumptions
regarding the supposed autarky of the Soviet economy and the primacy of
ideology over economic pragmatism. While its early chapters certainly
acknowledge the country’s tendency towards autarky during the conditions
of the 1930s (a trend that was in keeping with other major economies of the
time), the bulk of the book highlights the speed with which Soviet officials
sought to open their country to global trade following WWII. While mostly
focusing on the country’s relations with more developed western markets,
the work also provides important insight into Soviet efforts to foster trade
with the Third World, and the unexpectedly minor role that ideology played
in cultivating relations with anti-colonial states like India, Cuba and Egypt.
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Operating in a similar revisionist vein, Markets in the Name of
Socialism: the Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism, by Johanna Bockman,
offers a counter-intuitive history of the role of socialist economists in
promoting the global dissemination of market economics. Framed as an
intellectual history of neo-classical economics, the book traces the
transnational development of market socialist ideas and examines their
application in several intriguing case studies: Yugoslavia’s selfmanagement reforms of the early 1950s, the Hungarian New Economic
Mechanism of 1968, and the work of left- and right-wing economists at the
Italian Center for the Study of Economic and Social Problems. While most
histories of neoliberalism emphasize the struggle that took place between
Keynesians and monetarists in the United States and Western Europe
during the 1970s and 1980s, Bockman argues instead for a more nuanced
intellectual history of neoliberalism that highlights its emergence from
transnational networks of neo-classical economists that spanned both the
capitalist West and the socialist East.
Read together, both of these ambitious books demonstrate that,
rather than working within a separate and distinct socialist international
economy, the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe were
subordinate participants in the dominant liberal global order. The story of
this entanglement reveals important and unexpected insights into the
history of the second age of globalization.

Communism and the Global Revolution
Ironically, given the absence of the socialist world in conventional historical
accounts, one of the first descriptions of modern globalization appeared in
Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto of 1848. Identifying what they saw
as the historically unique tendency for capitalism to expand and reproduce
itself over ever-greater spaces, these two theorists noted the globalizing
dynamics of the system: “The need of a constantly expanding market for its
products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must
nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere.
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country”
(Tucker 1978, p. 476). The need for growth that was built into capitalist
markets collapsed world space and gradually integrated even the most
remote parts of the globe into the market system. The global character of
capitalism, they concluded, meant that the socialist revolution that would
supersede it also had to be global in scope.
The global vision of Marx and Engels carried over into those
movements that inherited their tradition, most consequentially the Bolshevik
Party that took power during the Russian Revolution of October 1917. For
Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Nikolai Bukharin and other leaders of the
Bolsheviks, the revolution that began in the imperial capital of St.
Petersburg had to rapidly expand not just throughout the rest of the Russian
Empire, but west into Europe and, eventually, throughout the world. It was
especially urgent for the Russian revolutionaries to be joined by their
comrades in Central and Western Europe. Russia was, after all, an
industrially underdeveloped country, dominated overwhelmingly by
inefficient and technologically backwards agriculture. To modernize the
country and build socialism, Russia would need the cooperation of the more
industrially-advanced economies of the West, in particular Germany.
Although uprisings inspired by the Russian Revolution broke out across
Central Europe between 1918-1920, with revolutionary movements briefly
seizing power in Munich, Budapest and Bratislava, these uprisings
collapsed in the face of counter-revolutions. By 1920 the Bolsheviks found
themselves in power, but globally isolated.
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From World Revolution to Socialism in One Country
The failure of the Russian Revolution to globalize was of enormous concern
for the Bolshevik leadership and they employed two strategies to try to
break out of their isolation. The first was to expand their geographical
horizons and look for support beyond the West. In September 1920 in the
Azerbaijani city of Baku, the Communist International (COMINTERN)
brought together hundreds of representatives of nationalist movements
across Eurasia. This Congress of the Peoples’ of the East called for an
alliance of communists and anti-colonial forces against European
colonialism in Asia, the Middle East and Africa that would have a powerful
influence on national liberation movements in the second half of the
twentieth century (Riddell 1993).
But alliances with the colonized world offered no solutions to the
immediate problems of economic collapse and industrial underdevelopment
in the Soviet Union. To this end the second strategy the Bolsheviks
deployed was to actively seek the few opportunities for foreign trade that
they could. The priority was to achieve a “technology transfer” through the
import of capital goods from Germany, Britain and the U.S., offset through
foreign borrowing and exports of primary articles, in particular agricultural
goods, timber and minerals. Although the market reforms of the New
Economic Policy, which included the introduction of a new gold-backed
currency, the chervonets, had by 1924 achieved a degree of
macroeconomic stabilization, foreign trade lagged (Sanchez-Sibony 2014).
The situation further deteriorated as the world economy entered the
depression at the end of the decade.
Far from resorting to the Keynesian policy of quantitative easing,
which would later become a central tenet for left wing governments in the
West, during the years of global depression the Soviets followed orthodox
liberal teachings and pursued recessionary policies to maintain gold parity.
While historians have typically explained the brutal industrialization and
collectivization campaigns of the late 1920s and early 1930s as a result of
Joseph Stalin’s ideological zealotry, these were, in fact, radical efforts to
maintain the country’s development strategy of technology transfer. As
Sanchez-Sibony argues (2014, p. 53), what is remarkable about the Soviet
Union during the 1930s is not its isolation from the world economy, but
precisely its continued commitment to the rules of liberal economic
orthodoxy: “The surprise was that the Soviet Union, unlike many
economically emerging countries during those years, did not default on its
debt, preferring to starve the Soviet population instead”. It was only in 1935,
when the last of the country’s foreign debts were paid off and an industrial
base had been established, that the Soviets began to adopt more autarkic
policies, a move that was, by then, in harmony with both New Deal America
and the fascist economies of Italy and Germany.
Even as the first socialist country withdrew from the global economy,
however, it was integrated into an increasingly globalized body of
knowledge: neoclassical economics. Since the late nineteenth century
neoclassical economists such as Léon Walras and Vilfredo Pareto, had
acknowledged the mathematical equivalence between competitive market
and planned socialist models, meaning that the latter could be a useful
analytical tool for reflecting on the former. The socialist experiment that
began in Russia, therefore, offered an important avenue of research for
neoclassical economics. Although economists within the Soviet Union were
isolated from advances in the field in the West, figures like Leonid
Kantorovich continued to develop neoclassical methods to optimize state
planning (Bockman 2011). Meanwhile, in the West, the Soviet Union served
as a useful site for research into the emerging field of comparative
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economics and young scholars like Abram Bergson, an American student
of the Soviet emigre Wassily Leontief, began researching aspects of the
Soviet planned economy (Bockman 2011). Precisely because earlier
theorists had established the mathematical equivalence of the competitive
market and socialist planning models, research into the Soviet system was
understood by neoclassical economists to provide insights into Western
market economies. The knowledge generated by these early transnational
exchanges help forge the discipline that trained many of the experts and
advisors that would staff the international financial and trade bodies in the
post-war era.

The Socialist World and the Second Age of Globalization
As noted above, historians of the Second Age of Globalization have tended
to adopt the Cold War paradigm of a “bipolar” division of the post-war world.
Within this paradigm the capitalist West operated according to principles of
liberal trade and multilateralism, while the socialist world pursued autarchic
policies and bilateral trade. It follows from this zero-sum perspective, then,
that globalization was a process intimately bound up with and restricted to
the capitalist world.
Given the degree to which this approach pervades our understanding
of post-war globalization, it is counter-intuitive to discover that for much of
the post-war period, the Soviet Union tirelessly tried to expand its foreign
trade with both the West and the global South, looking for opportunities to
restart the technology transfer that guided the country’s economic policy in
the 1920s. Even more surprisingly, despite scholars typically tracing
neoliberal economic doctrines to their roots in the Austrian and Chicago
schools, new research points to the key role played by socialist economists
from Eastern Europe in promoting anti-planning and market-oriented
economic models globally. As this research suggests, the socialist world
was intimately bound up in the Second Age of Globalization, despite efforts
by the U.S. to marginalize and exclude the Soviets and their satellites. The
socialist world did not pursue an “alternative globalization,” nor was it a
world of “virtual autarky”, but rather was shaped by a distinct experience of
the global liberal economic order established by the West following WWII.
In the immediate post-war years, the Soviet Union continued to
pursue an autarkic agenda, partly owing to the way in which the depression
of the 1930s had shaped its institutions and partly owing to Stalin’s distrust
of the West. The suspicion was mutual and, from 1947 onwards, the U.S.
actively sought means to exclude the Soviets and their satellites from the
new economic order it was establishing (Sanchez-Sibony 2014). Although
the post-war liberal order cannot be reduced to a U.S. empire, the
institutions that underpinned the Bretton Woods system reflected
Washington’s newfound global hegemony (Latham 1997). The pegging of
the dollar to gold ensured that control over global money supplies gave the
U.S. a certain coercive power and by 1948 the country held two-thirds of
the global money reserves (Sanchez-Sibony 2014). In addition, U.S. aid to
Europe and Japan, essential for rebuilding their economies, often came with
the political demand that these countries actively exclude the Soviets from
any post-war settlement in Europe or Eurasia. These efforts quickly bore
fruit and subsequent dollar shortages crippled the Soviets’ purchasing
power. To satisfy its import requirements the country came to play the role
of a “barter partner” with several developing states. Bilateral barter and
clearing agreements, already in place between the Soviets and their
Eastern European satellites, would become an important means of the
country’s integration into the global economy in the 1950s.
The death of Stalin and rise of the reform-minded Nikita Khrushchev
marked a significant shift for the Soviets and their place in the global
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economy. The years after WWII marked a steady growth in Soviet foreign
trade, shooting up from a dismal 500 million rubles in 1938 to a 2.9 billion
in 1950 and, five years later, reaching 5.8 billion (Sanchez-Sibony 2014, p.
93). Two factors led to this rapid growth during the late-1950s and early1960s. First, Khrushchev broke with Stalin’s paranoid approach to foreign
trade, and pioneered a more open and pragmatic policy, empowering the
long-serving Minister of Foreign Trade, Anastas Mikoyan, to reform and
expand Soviet trade networks. Second, Khrushchev’s rise to power
dovetailed with the final stages of economic reconstruction in Western
Europe and Japan, giving these states greater autonomy from the U.S. and
a willingness to begin to explore trade relations with the Soviets. In Japan,
where industrialists hoped to gain access to Siberia’s vast natural
resources, there was strong domestic pressure to open trade with the
Soviets and in December 1957 the two countries signed the first of many
trade agreements. Soviet-Japanese trade doubled in the subsequent three
years, and grew beyond this after 1960 (Sanchez-Sibony 2014, p. 103). A
year later, the controversial director of the Italian state energy sector, Enrico
Mattei, eager to break the Anglo-American monopoly on international oil
supplies, signed a contract with the Soviets for the delivery of crude oil. The
subsequent expansion of this agreement in the 1960s, which became a
means for the Soviets to build an advanced pipeline network using Western
capital and technology, laid the basis for Western Europe’s future reliance
on Russian and Central Asian oil and gas resources. The Italian deal was a
sign of things to come in Western Europe, and in the following decade EastWest trade in Europe grew steadily. The Soviets even managed to make
gains in the hold-out state of West Germany, with trade between the two
countries reaching 500 million rubles by 1970 (Sanchez-Sibony 2014, p.
190).
The opening up of Japan and Western Europe to Soviet trade helped
fuel the rapid growth of the latter’s economy, as Sanchez-Sibony (2014 p.
92) notes: “As the Soviet economy grew at already dizzying rates of 8-10
percent during the 1950s, foreign trade grew even faster at an average rate
of more than 12 percent for that decade.” Increased commercial ties with
the capitalist world, however, also exposed the weaknesses of the Soviet
command economy. As buyers in the First and Third worlds complained of
the poor quality of Soviet goods, jeopardizing future trade deals, Soviet
leaders were forced to develop quality controls to keep up with Western
producers. Despite the state’s revolutionary effort to construct an optimallyplanned national economy, the competitive pressures of world markets
made themselves felt within Soviet borders. As the Marxist theorist, Tony
Cliff, once observed, far from the vision of communism that captured Marx
and Engels’ imaginations, the Soviet economic system increasingly came
to function as a form of state capitalism. Although the productive powers
remained firmly in the hands of the state, the need to compete within a
global capitalist system subjected the Soviets to the same compulsions of
profit accumulation and expansion that characterized capitalist economies
(Cliff 1974). As Sanchez-Sibony’s work demonstrates, the possibilities of
socialist development in the Soviet Union were strictly delimited, and even
deformed, by the conditions set by an international economic system that
remained capitalist.
The opening up of the socialist world under Khrushchev expanded
the space for reform-minded economists across Eastern Europe to rethink
the Soviet model and its viability. From the mid-1950s Yugoslav, Hungarian,
Polish and Czechoslovak economists began to explore neoclassical
methods and to experiment with market socialist ideas. Yugoslavia was the
first to break with the Soviet model. Following the country’s split with
Moscow in 1948, Yugoslav communists sought to craft a decentralized
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system of socialism that divested power from the central state and
integrated the population into the political and economic institutions on a
participatory basis. “Worker self-management”, as this system came to be
known, transformed the Yugoslav economy, devolving managerial powers
to elected workers’ councils and introducing market reforms to determine
wages and prices. For Yugoslav reformers, the market offered a means for
the Marxist goal of the “withering away of the state” and a viable alternative
to the authoritarian, centralized model of Stalinism. The introduction of
market mechanisms within the domestic economy, quickly opened the
country up to foreign markets and by the mid-1960s Yugoslavia was deeply
integrated into global trade and capital flows (Unkovski-Korica 2016).
Although slower-paced, the turn towards market solutions to the
problems of socialism gained legitimacy across the more industrialized
societies of Eastern Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, promoting a dialogue
between western liberals and eastern socialists that centered on the
techniques of neoclassical economics. After WWII the U.S.-based
economist, Oskar Lange, returned to his native Poland to use his skills in
neoclassical analysis, particularly his expertise in general equilibrium
theories, to plan the Polish socialist system. In 1954 the rise of the reformminded Imre Nagy in Hungary, provided support to neoclassical and market
socialist economists who pursued market reforms. These reforms reached
a peak in 1968 with the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism,
which effectively transformed Hungary into a market socialist system similar
to Yugoslavia and opened the country up to the global economy (Bockman
2011). These trends in Eastern European economic thinking provided the
basis for a dialogue between economists in the capitalist and socialist
worlds, often leading to strange bedfellows, from revolutionary socialists to
neoliberals. Precisely because market socialists and neoliberals “shared
the idea of an optimizing market mechanism” they were able to “develop a
neoclassical dialogue about socialism” that reached across what Cold War
historians have typically assumed were two rival and self-enclosed
economic orders (Bockman 2011, p. 122).
Indeed, neoclassical models of socialism were not restricted to the
Eastern bloc. As the socialist world was integrated into the global economy
during the 1950s, it established ties with the developing economies of the
Third World. By the late-1960s Eastern European economists were
regularly being deployed as advisors to developing states, either through
bilateral ties or through the global institutions of the Bretton Woods system.
During the late-1960s and early-1970s the Hungarian neoclassical
economists Andras Brody and Tamos Szentes helped design economic
departments at the universities of Lusaka and Dar es Salaam, respectively.
Hungarians and Yugoslavs also worked at the World Bank, where they were
often appointed to advise developing countries with left wing governments.
Yugoslavia also played a key role in promoting neoclassical economics and
market socialist models through its leading involvement in the Non-Aligned
Movement. Fluency in the language of neoclassical economics allowed
Eastern European market socialists to move in the transnational networks
that underpinned the global economic order during the Second Age of
Globalization.

Conclusion
What was the experience of the socialist world in the Second Age of
Globalization? Bockman and Sanchez-Sibony’s texts provide three general
observations. First, and most significantly, this experience was not one of
self-isolation and autarky, but of exclusion. Post-war globalization was not
characterized by two rival global economic orders – one capitalist, the other
socialist – but rather by a single liberal capitalist economic order on the
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margins of which the Soviets and their East European satellites were forced
to operate. Second, their marginal position within this liberal order forced
the Soviets to rely on specific strategies, such as bartering and clearing
agreements that allowed peripheral economies to conserve their precious
dollar reserves. The socialist experience of globalization was one built less
through multilateral institutions than through ad hoc bilateral arrangements.
This strategy restricted the possibilities open to the socialist economies, in
particular limiting access to emerging technologies from the advanced
capitalist economies. Finally, and perhaps most unexpectedly, the socialist
world was integrated into a dense set of intellectual ties that spanned the
three worlds of the Cold War. This was especially the case in the discipline
of neoclassical economists, which offered an important site of intellectual
exchange between a diverse set of thinkers. The centrality of neoclassical
economists to the shaping of the global economy during the post-war era,
meant that, even as it was marginal(ized) in global trade, the socialist world
was deeply integrated into the intellectual processes that characterized the
Second Age of Globalization.
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